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(1] Automobiles-Care as to Guests-Statutory Limitation.-The

guest law as incorporated in Veh. Code, §
is a limitation
on the liability of a vehicle driver in cases
the rules of
ordinary negligence would otherwise apply.
(2] Appeal- Objections- Adherence to
of Case.-Generally, a party to an action may
for the first time on
appeal, change the theory of the cause
especially
when the theory
controverted questions of fact or mixed
of law and fact.
[3] !d.-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-If a question
of law only is presented on facts
in the record a
change in theory may be permitted on appeal, but if the new
theory contemplates a factual
the
of
which are open to controversy and were not put
presented at the trial, the opposing party should
quired to defend against it on appeal.
[4] Automobiles- Care as to Guests- Status of Defendant as
Driver.-It may not properly be said that the
manually
directing the operation of an automobile in
course of making a trip would, under all circumstances and
a matter of
law, lose his status as driver
Veh. Code,
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d,
Automobiles, § 237 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10]
§ 123(1);
[2, 3, 6] Appeal and Error, § 119;
Automobiles, § la.
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§
because he vacates the driver's
seat and is out of the car at the time of an accident.
[5] Id.-Care as to Guests-Status of Defendant as Driver.Whether the person manually directing the operation of an
automobile is or is not the driver of the car at the time of an
accident depends on the facts of each case, and a
under Veh.
§
the
ing to avoid
by establishing his status
driver should have the
present evidence on the
at the trial in response to
appropriate allegations and proof and have the
passed on by the
under
instructions.
[6] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-When the
facts with reference to a contention
made on appeal
appear to be undisputed and probably no different showing
could be made on a new trial, it is appropriate for the appellate
court to entertain the contention as a question of law.
[7] Automobiles- Care as to Guests- Existence of Host-guest
Relationship.-A person in an automobile cannot be a guest
except in relationship to another, namely, the driver as contemplated by Veh. Code, § 403, the guest law.
[8] Id.-Definitions-"Driver."-Though Veh. Code, § 69, defines
"driver" to be one "who drives" as distinguished from one
"who is driving," one who is driving is also a driver and falls
within the category of those who are "in actual physical control of the vehicle," and since the statute contemplates both
as drivers it must be assumed that the Legislature intended
that one not at a particular moment in actual control of a
vehicle may also be deemed to be a driver.
[9] Id.-Care as to Guests-Status of Defendant as Driver.-The
legislative intent to broaden the application of Veh. Code,
§ 403, the guest law, by amendment so as to include situations
where the vehicle was not "moving'' and the guest was not
"riding" would not make it imperative that the driver be
actually at the wheel at the time of an accident.
[10] Id.-Care as to Guests-Existence of Host-guest Relationship.
-In a case where a vehicle driver steps out and a guest remains in the vehicle, the guest still occupies the host's property, enjoys his hospitality and continues in the relationship
contemplated by Veh. Code, § 403, the guest law.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Affirmed.
Actions for damages for personal injuries arising out of an
automobile accident. Judgments for defendant affirmed.
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,James F. Boccardo and Edward ,J. Niland .for .Appellants.
Custer, ·warburton &
and W. R. Dunn .for lH~snonnen
are

Frank L. Custer

the plaintiffs .Amelia
Beatrice Schunke and Elizabeth
Hodenson
on verdicts .for the defendant
Gussie Maderis in .four separate actions for personal injuries
out o.f an automobile accident which occurred while
were
in the defendant's automobile.
'l'he causes were consolidated and tried together.
'fhe plaintiffs and another lady accompanied the defendant
in her automobile .from San Jose to Mountain View where
they attended a public card party, as they had done on other
occasions. On the return trip Mrs. Fitts sat in the front
seat next to the defendant who was in the driver's position,
and Mrs. Schunke sat on the extreme right of the front
seat. 'fhe other three ladies sat in the back. Upon arriving
in San Jose the defendant stopped her automobile in front
of Mrs. Fitts' home on level ground, stepped out of the car
and stood at the side thereof. The automobile was equipped
with automatic transmission and the defendant left the shift
lever in neutral position with the motor running. :B'rom the
neutral position very little force was required to move the
gear shift lever to drive or low positions, whereas had it
been left in the park position it would have been first necessary to lift the lever before changing its position. In the
park position the rear wheels would be locked and the car
could not be moved without skidding. From either the low
or drive, but not in neutral position the automobile would
proceed forward if the speed of the motor was advanced
beyond the idling speed, except when the emergency brake
was properly engaged.
After alighting the defendant invited Mrs. Pitts to leave
the car on the driver's side. This she proceeded to do. She
was elderly and infirm and had never driven an automobile.
In attempting to slide across the seat she apparently caused
the gear shift lever to be moved to either the low or drive
position and touched the accelerator, although there is no
direct evidence to that effect. The car went forward, jumped
a curb and crashed against a wall some 300 feet from where
the defendant alighted. .All four plaintiffs were injured.
The evidence was conflicting as to whether the plaintiffs

[47 C.2d

vehide ..
injury to or the death of
unless the plaintiff in any such
action establishes that such
or death proximately resulted from
intoxieation or wilful miseonduet of said
driver."
At the trial the
to show the inapplicability
of section 403
that they were paying
defendant driver. The deu.Jxmxu in that
and in response to a special
the jury found that the plaintiffs were guests
passengers. That flnding is supported by substantial evidence and there is no eontcntion to the contrary.
It thus established the relationship contemplated by the statute
and on the
on which the causes were tried foreclosed
liability on the
of the defendant. 'l'here was no evidence
of intoxication or wilful misconduct.
'l'he
well be afflrmed on the theory on
which
causes ·were tried without further discussion were
it not for another
advanced by the plaintiffs for the
first time on appeal to the effect that section 403 is not
...,U,AkCH~ to the facts of this case for another and independent
The
now contend that section 403 is not
as a matter of law, the defendant was
not the "driver" of the vehicle at the time of the accident
section 403.
asserts that where a cause has
in by the parties, an appela reversal on an entirely new theory. (See
Durkee v.
Land & Water
151 Cal. 561, 569 [91
P. 389] ; Merrill
29 Cal.App. 382, 386 [155
P.
.)
It is
rule that a party to an action
may not, for
first time on appeal, change the theory of
the cause of action. (Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 240 [22
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properly he said that
operation of an aniomobilc
therein \YOI!ld, under all
law, lose his stains
by section 40:3
is out of the ear at
lw is or is not i hr dri wr of tlw
~woul(l seem to depend on the
e1·ent the
to ;woirl liabil
status as the rlriver shouM hnYl' t
on tlH'
the trial in
tions and proof and have the
jury undrr· a ppropriatr:
[6] However, when as lwre the faets
contention newly made 011
and that Jn·obahl.\· llO
a new trial it is c1rrnH:\l
tention as a
on it aecordingly.
The
>Yllrf1H•r "''<"l
hm;t. (lrivPr is outsi<le of tlw
accident is clrrinwrl to be n
is not the easr. ln Pnm
81:3 [107 P .2<1 G24l. ii
a ride the plaintiff was a t:·w•,;:f.
temporarily left thr mdomnbile on
,;t
remained in ihe ear. T': roll,•J down thr
was injnrPd. 'l'lw eonrt lw111 tl1at wherP

b<· ma(le on
the eonfaet:; arHl pass
when

tllr~

. The plaintiff
plaintiff
al
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a demurrer without leave to
discussed in
sustained. 'rhe
~,. ..... ~~ was whether the
continued to
outside of the
exist while the driver was
automobile. The court concluded that
vvas a
the same
if the
in a moment
had
rolled down the
street . . . . As
person, without compensation to the
has entered a ear upon the invitation
of such driver and remains 'in the vehicle upon a
'during such ride' ( §
he is a
and cannot recover
damages for the simple negligenee of the host.'' The plaintiffs
here attempt to distinguish that case on the ground that the
only point discussed by the court was the status of the
plaintiff as a guest. The eourt did not discuss the status of
the defendant as a driver at the moment of injury. [7] But
obviously one cannot be a guest exeept in relationship to
section 403.
another, namely, the driver as contemplated
It is apparent that the court in the Frankenstein ease, in
determining that section 403 was applicable, deemed it necessary to conclude only that the plaintiff continued in the guest
status while the defendant absented himself from the automobile. The ease properly held that the relationship between
the parties of driver and guest satisfied the requirements of
section 403. On its facts it cannot be distinguished in theory
from the present case. (See also Castle v. McKeown, 327
Mich. 518 [42 N.W.2d
.)
The plaintiffs would require that the defendant be actually
driving the automobile or be "in a position to drive" in
order to become or remain within the provisions of the statute.
They rely on section 69 of the V chicle Code which provides
that a" 'Driyer' is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.'' The language of that section is
not helpful. It is significant that the statute defines driYer
to be one "who drives" as distinguished from one "who is
driving.'' [8] One who is driving
of eourse, also a driver
and falls within the category of those who are ''in aetual
physical control of a vehidc." Sinee the statute contemplates
both as drivers it must be assnmecl that the Legislature intended that one not at a particular moment in actual control
of a vehicle may also be deemed to be a driver.
Prager
v. Isreal, 15 Ca1.2cl 89, 93
P .2r1
.) Other code provisions impose on a driver the duty of furnishing aiel and
information when a vehicle is involved in an accident im-
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that the driver
Code,
482,
595 of the same code provides that "No
in control
or in charge of, a motor
stand on any highway unattended
"~ithout first
the brakes thereon and stopthe motor thereof." It is
the defendant that
she could not
contend that she had not violated
that section because she was outside of the ear when the
brakes were not set and the motor left running. Attention
has been called to the fact that in some jurisdictions it is
made a
offense for the driver of an automobile to leave
the ignition key in place when the car is unattended. It is
argned that it would be futile for the person responsible
for such a condition to resist prosecution because he was
outside of the car when cited for violation and therefore
was not the driver as contemplated by law. It is asserted
by the defendant that the present situation is in legal effect
the same as those above referred to and that by a parity of
reasoning she is entitled to the status of a driver within
the meaning of seetion 403. ·without deciding the effect of
other laws under the circumstances stated, references thereto
appear to be pertinent.
Prior to 1935 the contention that section 403 did not apply
to the driver who had temporarily left the automobile could
have reasonably been advanced. The statute then provided
that a guest must have accepted a ride in a vehiele "moving
upon any of the public highways'' and that he must have
been injured "while so riding as such guest." ( Stats. 1929,
ch. 787, § 1, p. 1580.) An amendment in 1935 eontains the
present language. The Legislature there substituted the
"in any vehicle upon a high~way" for "moving upon
any of the public highways," and "during such ride" for
"·while so riding." The significance of the amendment cannot
be disregarded. [9] The legislative intent to broaden the
application of the section (see Prager v. Isreal, sttpra, 15
Cal.2d 89, 94) to include situations where the Yehicle was
not "moving" and the guest was not "riding" would not
make it imperative that the driver be actually at the wheel
at the time of the accident. In commenting on the amendment, the court in Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal.App.2d 43 [127
P.2d 292], stated at page 47: ''In other words, it was not
necessary, as it was before under the former section, to
show that the vehicle vvas 'moving upon any highway,' but

0.2d

ride'
time elapsed
while so con's end. This conFrankenstein v. House . . . . "
is to be distinguished
left the vehicle.
at page 167 [293
'~ovrnN cases that ''This consistent
rule that the protection of the
suffered 'during the ride'
remained in or upon
the accident. After the guest steps
he enters into a pedestrian or other
occupies the host's property
. '' [10] But in a case where the
and the
remains in the vehicle the
the host's
enjoys his hospitality
and continues in the
contemplated by section
403. It is obvious that the limitation on liability provided for
therein relates to those acts of ordinary negligence performed
to that
(Ruel v. Langelier, 299 Mass.
240 [12 N.E.2d
It is concluded
the record supports the judgments
on the
on ·which the causes were tried, and also that
the contention first made
the plaintiffs on appeal that
the defendant \Yas not the driver of the car at the time of
the record. Other contenin support of their
and are deemed to be
without merit.
affirmed.
The

J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and

section 403, the California
to a situation where the person
the automobile was outside of the
the accident causing the injury occurred,
has concluded that the term "driver," as used
in the code
something more than one
actually in control of a vehicle. In support of this conclusion,
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con-

resultant incrpase m accidents

thereenacted a
recovery for ordinary neglithe hospitality of the
23 Cal.2d 237, 242 [143
Because the section
the plaintiff of his
common law action
his driver-host, it has been held
repeatedly that the section must be strictly construed. In
Prager v. Isreal, 15 Ca1.2d
93 [98 P.2d 729], we stated
that: "It is well settled in this and other states that the
so-called 'guest laws' are in derogation of the common law
and must be construed strictly. (See McCann v. Hoffman,
9 Cal.2d 279. 282 [70 P.2d 909] ; Callet v. Alioto, 210 CaL 65
[290 P.
; Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 254 f44
P.2d
; Iltmter v. Baldtt•in, 268 Mich. 106 [255 N.W. 431].)
Furthermore, as stated in Rocha v.
supm, 'The common law right of having redress for injuries wrongfully
inflicted, being lessened by such statutes, necessitates strict
construction, and also that cases be not held within the provisions of Stlch statutes unless it clearly appears that it should
be so determined.' (Emphasis ours.)"
In this light, then, the question here is whether the term
''driver'' is to be interpreted as denoting one who is actually
operating or in a position to operate a motor vehicle, or,
as the majority has concluded, as meaning- anyone who is
eapable of operating a vehicle regardless of where he may
be at the time in question. The
portions of section
403 read: "No rwrson who as a
a ride . . . has
any right of action . . .
. .. such guest during
. . . on aceount
such ride. . . . '' Aceorcling to the plain import of these
words, it cannot be said that the defendant, after leaving
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sections 69
"driver" as one "who
actual
control of a vehicle"), 482,
483, 484
a duty under criminal sanctions upon
a driver invohed in an accident to furnish aid and informaand 595
the
of unattended vehieles
without
the brakes and
the motor but not
the term "driver"). These sections are of doubtful
assistance here in view of the strict construction to which
section 403 is subject.
an examination of the sections does not lead
to the conclusion that the
term "driver" was intended to include one not actually
driving or in a position to drive the vehicle.
In one sense, of course, anyone who has learned to operate
a motor vehicle might be called a ''driver.'' By the same
token, anyone to whom the hospitality of another is extended
is a "guest" of the other. However, this broad meaning
of the term "guest" is not employed in determining the application of section 403, for as this court recently held in
Boyd v. Cress, 46 Cal.2d 164 [293 P.2d 37], one is not a
''guest'' within the purview of the section unless he is in or
upon the vehicle at the time of the accident. That the converse is true, that is, that one is not a ''driver'' within the
purview of the section unless he is operating the vehicle,
is indicated in the case of Y!tekett V. railthorpe, 207 Iowa
613 [223 N.W. 254]. Interpreting a statute similar to section 403, the Iowa Supreme Court said: "Manifestly, Section
5026-b1, supra, contemplates a person on such journey in a
motor vehicle, driven ot· 01Jeratccl by some one [emphasis
added] . . . . Entrance must be made into an automobile then
in the operation of a driver, so that a journey can be taken.
The1·e can be no trip withmtt a driver. [Emphasis added.]
Thus a person in such motor car without a driver operating
it is not a passenger, within the meaning of the section under
consideration; for, in the absenee of the necessary operator,
there can be no journey, and consequently no riding. Without the driver, the journey, and the riding, there is no passenger, in the case at bar. If then, under the provisions of
the statute in question, there is no driver, there can be no
passenger." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that the court interpreted "driYer" as meaning
one actually operating the automobile. By analogy, this interpretation is in accord with the California cases which have

for the position
here for the court in that
relied
, 111 Conn. 88 [149 A.
:302 Mass. 273 [ l!J N.E.2d
)
conclusion tlJCre reached. Both
behind the steering wheel, which was
not the case in Prankcnslcin v. IIottsc or here. Moreover,
in the Head case, ·which was decided in J\Tassachusetts which
has no guest statute but which restricts a guest's recovery
under its common law (R1tel v. Langelier, 29~) Mass. 240, 243
[12 N.E.2d 735] ) , the guest was not yet in the vehiele when
the mishap occurred, a situation in which section 403 ·would
elearly not
in California (Boyd v. Cress, snpra.)
'I'he reasoning advanced in the majority opinion that the
1985 amendment of section 408 precludes the necessity of
the driver being at the vYheel is not borne out by the opinion
of this court in the Boyd case. There, a unanimous court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Shenk, said ( 46 Cal.2d at p.
167) : "The defendant eonstrues the 1935 amendment as
extending the guest statute to injuries occurring during or
incidental to the 'journey,' notwithstanding that the plaintiff
is entirely outside of the automobile when the injury is
sustained. But this construction would involve the reading
of new and different language into the statute.'' If the 1935
amendment leaves intact the requirement that the guest be
in the vehicle, it like·wise leaves intact the requirement enuneiated in Puckett v. Pailthorpe, snpra, that there be a driver
in control of the vehicle. To hold otherwise is to read "new
and different language into the statute."
Clearly then, as section 403, in restricting a guest's cause
of action arising ''during such ride,'' requires that the guest
be in the vehicle, consistent interpretation of the section
demands that there also be a driver in the vehicle, for without
a rider and a driver, there can be no ''ride.'' For this reason,
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was (1enied December
] 9, ] 95fi. Carter, .J., was of the opinion that the petition
shouhl be granted.

